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Survey of Criminal Procedure-
Alternative Dispositions of Defendants 
The criminal justice system provides various alternatives for the 
disposition of criminal defendants. Three of these alternatives, pretrial 
intervention, drug treatment, and probation, were dealt with in recent 
New Jersey Supreme Court decisions. The court examined the sub-
stantive criteria and procedures used in assigning each disposition and 
focused primarily on the desire to provide rehabilitative opportunities 
for each defendant. This note will examine those decisions and the 
implications of the court's concentration on the goal of rehabilitation. 
I. PRETRIAL INTERVENTION 
In State v. Leonardis 1 and in subsequently issued "Guidelines for 
Operation of Pretrial Intervention in New Jersey," 2 the court estab-
lished new criteria and procedures governing admission to Pretrial 
Intervention (PTI) Programs. These programs provide defendants 
the opportunity to have complaints or indictments dismissed with 
the approval of the program director and the prosecutor upon suc-
cessful participation in a program of treatment and counseling.3 
In Leonardis, the court invalidated restrictive Bergen County PTI 
admissions criteria and held that PTI programs may no longer use 
the nature of the crime with which the defendant is charged as the 
sole basis for rejection.4 Under the Bergen County criteria, defen-
1. 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976), Motion for Clarification and Rehearing 
Granted, No. M-1234 (Sept. 8, 1976). 
2. 99 N.J.L.J. 865 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines]. 
3. N.J. CT. R. 3:28 authorizes the county assignment judge (or a judge he 
appoints) to suspend proceedings against any defendant on recommendation of the 
program director with the consent of the prosecutor and the defendant. The program 
lasts three months, after which the charges against the defendant are dismissed, the 
program is extended three months, or the defendant is returned to the ordinary 
course of prosecution. Participation is limited to two three-month periods, except 
in cases of drug dependency. 
The supreme court has approved PTI programs in 17 counties. See J. Paul, 
Pretrial Intervention: A Report On A Workshop Sponsored by the N.J. Bar Institute 
& Law Center, Feb., 1976, 99 N.J.L.J. 865, 875 (1976); Notice to the Bar Re PTf 
in Ocean County, 100 N.J.L.J. 121 (1977); Notice Re PTI in Burlington County, 
id.; Notice to the Bar Re PTI in Hunterdon County, 100 N.J.L.J. 91 (1977); Notice 
to the Bar Re PTI in Somerset County, 100 N.J.L.J. 78 (1977); Notice to the Bar Re 
PTI in Salem County, 100 N.J.L.J. 66 (1977). For a description of the New 
Jersey PTI Program, see 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1203 (1975). The court has also 
provided an extensive discussion of the legal background of PTI. 71 N.J. at 92-107, 
363 A.2d at 324-32. 
4. 71 N.J. at 112, 363 A.2d at 335. Leonardis combined the appeals of three 
defendants, two from Bergen County and one from Hudson County. The issues 
raised by the appeal of the Hudson County defendant are discussed at text accom-
panying notes 26-33 infra. 
592 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2515892 
1977] 1975-76 N.]. SUPREME COURT TERM 593 
dants charged with certain offenses were ordinarily denied entrance 
into the program.5 Two of the defendants in Leonardis, one charged 
with possession with intent to distribute marijuana and the other 
indicted for conspiracy to distribute marijuana, had been summarily 
excluded because "sale of a controlled dangerous substance" was 
listed as one of those offenses.6 
The court determined that since the main purpose of PTI programs 
is rehabilitation, admission should be based not on the offense but 
on the offender's capacity for rehabilitation. Important considera-
tions ignored by the Bergen County officials were "the defendant's 
willingness to avoid conviction and its attendant stigma, the motiva-
tion behind the commission of the crime, the age and past criminal 
record of the defendant and his current rehabilitation efforts." 7 In 
striking down the Bergen County admissions standards, the court 
expressed concern for the possibility that arbitrary denial of the re-
habilitative benefits of PTI may be a denial of equal protection.s 
Noting, however, that the United States Supreme Court would prob-
5. The following offenses were expressly excluded under the Bergen County 
criteria: 
1. Heinous Offenses: Atrocious Assault and Battery where the victim is 
seriously injured; HOmicide; Mayhem; Forcible Rape; Assault and Battery 
on a Police Officer involving injury; Armed Robbery where the victim is 
injured; Sale of a Controlled Dangerous Substance .... 
2. Offenses Related to Psychological Disorder: . . . . Arson, aberrant sexual 
behavior including Incest, Sodomy, Indecent Exposure, when associated 
with psychological defect or the use of force to attempt any sexual act. . . . 
3. Victimless Crimes . . . : Prostitution and Gambling. . . . 
Bergen County Pre-Trial Intervention Project ( unpaginated) ( undated). 
The Hudson County PTI program excluded offenders charged with "heinous 
offenses," including crimes of extreme violence when associated with serious injury 
and sale or dispensing of significant amounts of controlled dangerous substances 
or other drugs, especially where not associated with the applicant's addiction. Zaloom, 
Pretrial Intervention Under New Jersey Court Rule 3:28, Proposed Guidelines for 
Operation, 2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 178, 185 (1974). 
6. The supreme court opinion states only that defendant Leonardis was charged 
with possession of marijuana. The actual complaint filed against Leonardis charged 
him with "possession with intent to distribute." Brief for Defendant-Appellant in 
Support of Motion for Leave to Appeal at 2, State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 
A.2d 321 (1976). Apparently there was proof that Leonardis intended to sell the 
marijuana, because the defendant's statement of facts acknowledged that the 
offense "involved the sale of marijuana." Id. There is no separate New Jersey 
statute covering "sale" of controlled dangerous substances. Rather, sales are 
subsumed under "distribution." See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-19 (Supp. 1976). 
7. 71 N.J. at 112, 363 A.2d at 335. ' 
The defendants contended that the program officials were not fairly applying 
their own criteria because use of the phrase "ordinarily excluded" implied that 
even those charged with "heinous offenses" should have an opportunity to present 
arguments for their admission. Id. at 110, 363 A.2d at 334. The court, however, 
was careful to point out that it was not merely examining the criteria "as applied." 
Rather, the court found that the criteria themselves unduly emphasized the nature 
of the offense. Id. at 111-12, 363 A.2d at 335. 
8. Id. at 112-13, 363 A.2d at 335-36. 
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ably not find that equal protection gives rise to a right to rehabilita-
tion,9 the New Jersey court characterized its decision as an interpreta-
tion of court rules.10 The court also expressed concern for the equal 
protection implications of the county-by-county variations in the 
availability of PTI throughout the state and urged adoption of a 
unifonn statewide program based on the principles espoused in 
Leonardis.l1 
Two months after the Leonardis opinion the supreme court adopted 
PTI Guidelines as the foundation for such a statewide program. The 
Guidelines, which apply to all state PTI programs, set forth the goals 
of PTI, criteria to be employed in making admissions decisions, and 
procedures for defendants to contest unfavorable decisions on the 
part of prosecutors or program officials. The spirit of Leonardis is 
maintained by requiring that admission decisions be based on the 
defendant's "amenability to correction [and] responsiveness to re-
habilitation" as well as on the nature of the offense.12 The Guidelines 
require, therefore, that programs consider applications from "[ a]ny 
defendant accused of crime," and accept any defendant who "demon-
strates sufficient effort to effect necessary behavioral change and 
show[s] that future criininal behavior will not occur." 13 
The Guidelines, however, retreat somewhat from the position that 
it is improper to predicate admissions on the nature of the defendant's 
9. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974). 
10. 71 N.J. at 108-09, 363 A.2d at 333-34. 
11. Id. at 120-21, 363 A.2d at 340. This reasoning was adopted in State v. 
Kowitski, 145 N.J. Super. 237, 367 A.2d 459 (Law Div. 1976) (defendant denied 
equal protection of law because county in which crime was committed had no 
PTI program while "right" of access to PTI was granted defendants in other 
counties; rendered moot by adoption of Somerset County PTI program). 
12. Guidelines, supra note 2, at 865. 
13. Id. at 874 (Guideline 2). The court's action reflects a national trend 
toward expanding the scope of diversionary programs to include persons charged 
with crimes once considered quite serious. Barriers to drug offenders in particular 
are being abolished. R. NIMMER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS 
OF PROSECUTION 17, 49-50, 57-58 (1974). Both the New Jersey Supreme Court 
and the legislature have previously endorsed a policy of avoiding harsh penalties 
for minor drug offenders. Cf. State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 270 A.2d 1 (1970); 
State v. Staten, 62 N.J. 435, 303 A.2d 65 (1973) (per curiam). But cf. State v. 
Knight, 72 N.J. 193,369 A.2d 913 (1976) (refusal to review trial court's choice 
of prison term instead of Youth Correctional Institutional Complex commitment for 
twenty-two-year-old heroin addict never previously incarcerated). The expansion 
of PTI programs coincides with a growing dissatisfaction with the results of pro-
longed incarceration and a desire, therefore, to impose the shortest possible periods 
of confinement. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, A.B.A. 
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 61-63 
(Approved Draft 1968); MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); 
TASK FORCE ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw 
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REpORT: THE COURTS 
15 (1967). 
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offense.14 For example, the Guidelines emphasize PTI's concern with 
the '1ess serious" offenses by stating that one purpose of PTI is to 
divert consideration of those offenses from the courts in order to "focus 
expenditure of criminal justice resources on matters involving serious 
criminal and severe correctional problems." 15 Furthermore, although 
defendants accused of any crime are eligible for admission, Guideline 
3 ( i ) requires that programs should ordinariI y reject defendants 
charged with crimes which are: 
"( 1) part of organized criminal activity; or (2) part of a continuing 
criminal business or enterprise; or ( 3 ) deliberately committed with 
violence or threat of violence against another person; or (4) a breach 
of the public trust where admission to a PTI program would deprecate 
the seriousness of defendant's crime .... " 16 
The Guidelines also provide that several other gro,:!ps of offenders 
should ordinarily be rejected, i.e., defendants who have previously 
been convicted of crimes of a "serious nature" or who have previously 
been enrolled in PTI or similar programs.17 
Therefore, while the court recognizes that it may be unwise to 
admit to PTI those who have committed serious crimes, Guideline 
3 ( i) redefines the term "serious crime" for purposes of PTI. Guideline 
3 ( i) presents a potential problem in that the standards used in the 
redefinition do not appear to further the court's avowed goals of uni-
formity and predictability of decisions,18 simply because they are not 
the kind of standards that can ever be reduced to uniformity and 
predictability. In contrast to the Bergen County criteria which listed 
specific crimes which ordinarily precluded admission,19 Guideline 
3 ( i) dictates that defendants charged with crimes in four broad 
categories be excluded.20 Those categories require subjective deter-
minations based on more factors than the alleged criminal acts. The 
court does not supply standards for deciding whether an act is part 
of organized crime,21 a continUing criminal enterprise, or a breach of 
public trust. Similarly, Guideline 3( e) mandates that those who 
14. The "retreat" from Leonardis is also made evident in the heavy burden 
placed on those who are denied admission to PTI to challenge that determination. 
See text accompanying note 29 infra. 
15. Guidelines, supra note 2, at 865 (Guideline 1 (D)) (emphasis added). 
16. Guidelines, supra note 2, at 874. 
17.Id. (Guidelines 3(E), 3(G)). 
18. See State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. at 98, 363 A.2d at 328. 
19. See note 5 supra. 
20. See text accompanying note 16 supra. 
21. For examples of the difficulty involved in using "organized crime as a 
legal standard, see Catalano v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 346, 349-50 (D. Conn. 
1974). For an example of the scope of activity that could be subsumed under 
"organized crime," see "Hustler" Conviction Is Pondered in Ohio, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 10, 1977, at 21, col. 6 (collaboration to promote obscene magazine is within 
Ohio's organized crime statute). 
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have previously committed "serious" crimes should ordinarily be ex" 
eluded without further explanation as to which crimes are "serious." 22 
Moreover, the court's general mandate that decisions be based on 
the defendant's "amenability to correction [and] responsiveness to 
rehabilitation" provides no explanation of the bases on which such 
determinations are to be made. It is doubtful that anyone can ac-
curately predict who will successfully respond to a PTI program.23 
Nevertheless, the court assumes that program officials can identify 
such individuals.24 
The court's effort to open the program to more defendants and the 
concomitant replacement of definite criteria with vague standards 
may increase the exercise of individual discretion by program officials 
without adequate review or guidance. In this respect, therefore, the 
Guidelines may be counterproductive of the goal of statewide uni-
formity.25 
In addition to the court's redefinition of substantive PTI admission 
standards, the court has also changed PTI admissions procedures. In 
Leonardis, the court affirmed a Hudson County trial judge's order 
that the prosecutor must provide a written explanation for his refusal 
to admit a defendant into PTI.26 The court viewed this requirement 
22. Guidelines, supra note 2, at 865. 
23. No controlled study of PTI has ever been made in New Jersey. Paul, 
supra note 3, at 879. For an analysis of statistical claims of success of the Man-
hattan Court Employment Project, which indicates that no conclusion can be drawn 
as to the effectiveness of that program, see Zimring, Measuring the Impact of 
Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Justice System, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 224 (1974). 
The inability to evaluate offenders on an ad hoc, individualized basis is dem-
onstrated by the United States Board of Parole's decision to abandon the rehabili-
tative model in determining parole eligibility. Coffee, The Future of Sentencing 
Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV. 
1361, 1440-41 (1975). The date of parole is now determined largely by guide-
lines which rate inmates on the basis of the seriousness of the offense they have 
committed and a "salient factor score" which is a function of objective criteria 
such as prior convictions, age, age at first conviction, education, and proposed 
living site upon release. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976). These factors determine whether 
or not the prospective parolee is in a class of people likely to commit another crime. 
One commentator points out that by using such criteria, "the Board has implicitly 
acknowledged that it is unable to judge or measure rehabilitative progress and so 
will confine its efforts to seeking to incapacitate offenders." Coffee, supra, at 1441. 
See also Parole Release Decisions and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L. REV. 
810, 820-24 (1975). 
24. The court may have been impressed by claims of success of various pro-
grams. For example, the Hudson County program cites case histories of "successfully 
rehabilitated" defendants such as "Sergio Q.:' whose offense of atrocious assault 
and battery was determined to be the result of his unemployment. After being 
provided with counseling and a job, he did not repeat the offense. Zaloom, supra 
note 5, at 187-88. The program, however, does not report the number of such 
diagnoses which turned out to be wrong. The claims of success of many diver-
sionary programs are based on such impressionistic judgments, rather than on em-
pirical studies. NIMMER, supra note 13, at 4. 
25. 71 N.J. at 120-21, 363 A.2d at 340. 
26. Id. at 119, 363 A.2d at 339. 
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as consistent with the national and state trend toward imposing due 
process requirements on all government decisions which result in a 
"grievous loss" of liberty or property. Here, the defendant's interest 
in obtaining the rehabilitative benefits of a PTI program warranted 
at least a statement of reasons for denial of admission. The court 
also noted that recorded reasons for exclusion from the program will 
facilitate judicial review of the prosecutor's actions, further the goals 
of PTI by providing information on which to evaluate and improve 
the still experimental programs, and serve the rehabilitative function 
by causing defendants to feel that they have been dealt with fairly.27 
The Guidelines further expand the procedural protections afforded 
the defendant. Each defendant is given the opportunity to present 
arguments for his acceptance in the program and to contest his exclu-
sion. Under the Guidelines, "[ w ]hen the application indicates factors 
which would ordinarily lead to exclusion . . . the applicant never-
theless shall have the opportunity to present . . . any facts or mate-
rials demonstrating his amenability to the rehabilitative process, 
shOWing compelling reasons justifying his admission and establishing 
that a decision against enrollment would be arbitrary and unreason-
able." 28 
Following the court's language in Leonardis, the Guidelines require 
program directors as well as prosecutors to disclose their reasons for 
granting or denying requests for PTI admissions in writing. Further-
more, the defendants may challenge these decisions before the desig-
nated judge. "The challenge is to be based upon alleged arbitrary 
or capricious action, and the defendant has the burd~n 5>f showing 
that the program director or prosecutor abused his discretion in pro-
cessing the application. . .. [T]hereafter, defendant or prosecutor 
alf th rt'd" "29 can . . . appe rom e cou s eclslon.... 
The new admission procedures represent a continuation of a trend 
to increase procedural protections available in New Jersey PTI pro-
grams. In 1974, the New Jersey court rules were amended to give 
the accused an opportunity to be heard, with counsel, on a recom-
mendation that the prosecution proceed after the accused had par-
ticipated in the program; The defendant was also protected from 
27. ld. at 114-19, 363 A.2d at 336-39. For further discussion of the reasons 
given in sentencing, see 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 657 (1977). 
28. GUidelines, supra note 2, at 874 (Guideline 2). Prior to promulgation of 
the Guidelines, a hearing was required only for those enrolled in PTI and returned 
to the ordinary course of prosecution. No opportunity was provided to challenge 
the denial of admission to PTI at the outset. N.J. CT. R. 3:28. 
29. Guidelines, supra note 2, at 875 (Guideline 8). The jurisdiction of appellate 
courts to review PTI decisions was challenged by the state. 7I N.J. ~t 108. 363 
A.2d at 333. The court conceded that court rules did not provide for such review 
and based its jurisdiction on its authority to interpret court rules. ld. at 108-09, 
363 A.2d at 333-34. 
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the use at trial of program reports as well as statements made during 
participation in PTI.30 This protection was enhanced by the inclu-
sion of all PTI records and reports within the scope of Rule 1: 38, 
which protects the confidentiality of court records.a1 The rules also 
require judges to inform defendants of application procedures for 
PTI programs. a2 
The requirement that the prosecutor provide written, reviewable 
reasons for any decision concerning PTI admission represents a policy 
of expanded judicial review of prosecutorial discretion. Traditionally, 
the courts have been reluctant to interfere in prosecutorial decisions 
because of the prosecutor's position as a representative of the execu-
tive branch histOrically vested with broad discretionary powers.aa 
30. N.J. CT. R. 3:28, Comment (Pressler ed. 1976). 
31. N.J. CT. R. 1:38, Comment (Pressler ed. 1976). This protection is repeated 
in Guideline 5. The court emphasized that the maintenance of a counselor-patient 
relationship is more important than the need for disclosure at trial, and that the 
use of information gathered in a PTI program would be "contrary to basic standards 
of due process and fundamental fairness." GUidelines, supra note 2, at 874. 
32. N.J. CT. R. 3:4-2, Comment (Pressler ed. 1976). 
33. See In re Ringwood Fact Finding Comm., 65 N.J. 512, 526, 324 A.2d 1, 8 
(1974) (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting in part). See also State v. Conyers, 
58 N.J. 123, 147-48, 275 A.2d 721, 733-34 (1971) (trial court should honor pro-
secutor's request to waive the death penalty although jury verdict called,· by 
implication, for that sentence); Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 225, 265 A.2d 678, 
686 (1970) (reversed chancery division's grant of summary judgment for declaratory 
judgment against Attorney General's memorandum asking local officials for reports 
on potential civil disorders: "It is a serious matter for the judiciary to interfere 
with the preventive measures devised by the executive branch . . . ."); State v. 
LeVien, 44 N.J. 323, 326-27, 209 A.2d 97, 99 (1965) (individual who killed fellow 
mental patients had no right .to have criminal proceeding brought against him); 
State v. Murphy, 36 N.J. 172, 177-78, 175 A.2d 622, 625 (1961) (error for trial 
court to issue subpoena on its own motion for statement that prosecutor had agreed 
not to use at trial: "A prosecutor may sensibly decide . . . not to use evidence 
which would advance the State's case"); State v. Walls, 138 N.J. Super. 445, 449, 
351 A.2d 379, 381 (1976) (trial court may not require prosecutor to conduct a 
lineup). 
The federal courts have refused to review prosecutorial decisions unless the 
prosecutor denies a constitutional right or unconstitutionally discriminates against a 
defendant. "[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in 
itself a federal constitutional violation," unless "selection [is] deliberately based upon 
an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification." 
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). See also Newman v. United States, 
382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). 
This approach is illustrated in United States v. Smith, 354 A.2d 510 (D.C. Ct. 
App. 1976). There the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a prosecu-
torial policy of denying diversionary program admission to any defendant who litigated 
any issue in his case. Smith was denied admission because he made a pretrial motion 
to dismiss, alleging that the penalty he faced violated the eighth amendment. The 
court held that, since he could have raised the constitutional issue after the prosecutor 
considered his eligibility for diversion, the prosecutor's policy did not prevent Smith from 
exercising his eighth amendment rights. The court stated, however, that any prosecu-
torial policy that had that objective or effect would be invalid. ld. at 514. The same 
court subsequently upheld a District of Columbia Superior Court order requiring 
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There has been, however, some indication in New Jersey of judicial 
interest in overseeing prosecutorial discretion. In State v. Winne 84 
the supreme court held that a county prosecutor· could be found 
guilty of common law nonfeasance in office without a showing of 
corruption or willfulness.35 The court rejected the argument that 
removal by impeachment is the "sole remed[y] available to the State 
for any misconduct of a county prosecutor" 86 and declared that the 
prosecutor "must at all times act in good faith and exercise all reason-
able and lawful diligence in every phase of his work." 87 In In re In-
vestigation Regarding Ringwood Fact Finding Committee 8S the court 
announced, but did not exercise, its power "within the extraordinarily 
comprehensive prerogative writ jurisdiction" to review prosecutorial de-
cisions.3o In Leonardis the court appears to have taken the first steps 
toward actually reviewing a prosecutor's discretionary acts. 
Nonetheless, the court has not indicated the proper dimensions of 
prosecutorial discretion with regard to PTI programs.40 Realistic stan-
the prosecutor to produce written guidelines relating to the operati9D of the District's 
First Offender Treatment Program. The order had issued because the defendant 
alleged that he was refused admission to the program because of the political nature 
of Iiis crime. The prosecutor refused to comply with the order and was thus held 
in "technical" contempt. See In re Cys, 362 A.2d 726 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976). 
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 
refers to the "prosecutor's fundamental right to prosecute." Standard 2.2 states 
that "[t]he decision by the prosecutor not to divert a particular defendant should 
not be subject to judicia! review." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS: COURTS REpORT 40-41 (1973) [hereinafter cited 
as CoURTS]. The proposed Prosecutorial Discretion Act, a statutory PTI program, 
would relegate all decisions about diversion to the prosecutor's discretion with no 
allowance for judicial review. See N.J. Assembly Bill No. 1648 (1976); N.J. 
Assembly Bill No. 906 (1976). 
34. 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953). 
35. The Bergen County prosecutor was indicted for failing to investigate illegal 
gambling activities of which he was aware. Id. at 162, 96 A.2d at 68. 
36. Id. at 171-72, 96 A.2d at 73. 
37. Id. at 174, 96 A.2d at 74. 
38. 65 N.J. 512, 324 A.2d 1 (1974). 
39. Id. at 516-17, 324 A.2d at 3-4. In Ringwood the court reversed an order 
compelling a prosecutor to present to a grand jury evidence of an election law 
violation. The court stated that the election law authorized such orders, but found 
that the prosecutor had not acted arbitmrily. Id. at 516, 324 A.2d at 3. The 
court quoted approvingly Kenneth Culp Davis' criticism of judicial reluctance to 
review prosecutorial discretion and his statement that "courts should continue their 
gradual movement toward opening the judicial doors to review of prosecutors' dis-
cretion." Id. at 516 n.o, 324 A.2d at 3 n.o. 
40. There has been increasing advocacy of "explicit [prosecutorial] policies for the 
dismissal or informal disposition of the cases of certain marginal offenders." PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE 
SOCIETY 134 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE]; see also ADvISoRY CoMMlTI'EE 
ON THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS, A.B.A. PROJEcr ON STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 64-66, 
84 (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSECUTION]; CoURTS, sup1'a note 
33, at 39. 
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dards for review are a prerequisite for effective reviewY The Leonardis 
opinion and the Guidelines emphasize decisionmaking based on the per-
sonality of the defendant and his susceptibility to rehabilitation. Prose-
cutors are trained as lawyers, however, not mental health professionals. 
Even trained professionals are not necessarily able to make reliable judg-
ments similar to those demanded by the court.42 If a prosecutor's con-
clusion that the defendant has low rehabilitative potential will satisfy 
the court's demand for a statement of reasons, no meaningful judicial 
review will take place. 
Furthermore, neither Leonardis nor the Guidelines gives any guid-
ance as to whether other typical prosecutorial concerns will be consid-
ered valid bases upon which to make admissions decisions. Would the 
court allow a prosecutor to deny entry into PTI to a defendant who 
could be rehabilitated and whose crimes fell outside the four offense 
categories ordinarily excluded from admission under Guideline 3(i), but 
which the prosecutor felt "were the kinds of offenses that should be most 
vigorously prosecuted in view of the community's law enforcement 
needs"? 43 Could the prosecutor consider the deterrent effects of pros-
ecution? 44 Could the prosecutor choose to divert his "weak" cases and 
prosecute his "strong" ones? 45 Would the court permit a prosecutor 
with limited resources to prosecute only a few offenders selected at 
random and to divert others charged with the same crime? 46 Would 
the court consider it proper for the prosecutor to give any weight to 
the feelings of the victim? 47 
41. The Leonardis court suggests that there will be judicial review of two 
aspects of the prosecutor's decision, the judgment of the seriousness of the offense 
and the conclusion about rehabilitative potential. See 71 N.J. at 122, 363 A.2d 
at 340. But without more explicit standards, prosecutors may be able to thwart 
judicial review of PTI admissions decisions through the use of "boilerplate" language, 
as they now avoid review of decisions not to prosecute by announcing that available 
evidence is insufficient. See F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A 
SUSPECT WITH A CiUME 154-56 (1969). 
42. See note 2.'3 and accompanying text supra. 
43. See CHALLENGE, supra note 40, at 133; see generally NIMMER, supra note 
13, at 96. 
44. Although Guidelines 1 ( a) and 1 (b) use the word "deter" in listing the purposes 
of PTI, it appears that it is used to mean merely "prevent" rather than "prevent through 
fear," its common meaning. 
45. See generally NIMMER, supra note 13, at 13. 
46. "Selective enforcement may also be justified when a striking example or a 
few examples are sought in order to deter other violators, as part of a bona fide 
rational pattern of general enforcement, in the expectation that general compliance 
will follow and that further prosecutions will be unnecessary." People v. Utica 
Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 12, 21, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, 136 (1962). 
47. 
Local prosecuting officials concede that "great weight" is given to the 
victim's desires in serious felony cases, especially homicides. This could 
mean that if . . . the facts and circumstances of a case do not clearly 
warrant prosecution for an unlawful homicide, the adamant victim could 
overcome the prosecutor's reluctance to charge. 
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In addition to the substantive questions raised by the court's new 
approach to PTI, the Guidelines also add another layer of motions, 
hearings, and appeals to the criminal justice system. Each decision, 
such as whether the crime was one of those within the categories of 
ordinarily excluded offenses, whether a previous offense was "serious," 
or whether the defendant possesses the requisite rehabilitative potential, 
may be the subject of litigation. Although defendants face a heavy 
burden in challenging prosecutors, the Guidelines allow defense counsel 
to delay proceedings by contesting and appealing a variety of heretofore 
unreviewable issues. As the Attorney General warned following the 
Leonardis decision, "PT! will become another time-consuming facet of 
an already lengthy process instead of serving its intended purpose of 
expediting dispositions and permitting a reallocation of resources."·8 
II. DRUG TREATMENT 
In State v. Alston 49 and State v. Sayko,50 the court affirmed the pro-
priety of admitting defendants found guilty of drug possession into a 
statutorily created drug treatment program. In so doing, the court 
attempted to clarify the factors to be considered by the trial judge in 
admissions decisions. 
Section 27 of the New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act 51 
provides an opportunity for first offenders charged with, or found guilty 
of, possession of or being under the influence of certain "controlled dan-
gerous substances" to receive treatment and to avoid the stigma of a 
criminal conviction. The trial court may suspend proceedings and place 
such defendants under supervisory treatment for a period not exceeding 
three years.52 Upon completion of the treatment program, the court 
Hall, The Role of the Victim in the Prosecution and DispOSition of a Criminal Case, 
28 VAND. L. REV. 931, 948 (1975). See also NIMMER, supra note 13, at 13. For 
other criteria which prosecutors may feel are relevant to the decisionmaking process 
and which appear to be outside the standard approved by the court, see NATIONAL 
DISTRICT ATTORNEYS Assoc.: SCREENING OF CRIMINAL CASES 2 (undated); PROSECU-
TION, supra note 40, at 92-98. 
48. Petition of State for Clarification and Application for Stay at 8, State v. 
Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976). See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973). An appreciation of the amount of litigation which the 
court's policy might engender can be gained from estimates that there will be 
13,000 applicants for PTI each year when the program is available statewide, and 
that one half of those applicants (6,500) will qot be accepted for admission. Paul, 
supra note 3, at 878. But see State v. White, 145 N.J. Super. 257, 367 A.2d 469 
(Law Div. 1976) (evidence may not be presented to the court in order to substantiate 
murder defendant's claim that program director and prosecutor acted arbitrarily in 
denying PTI admission). 
49. 71 N.J. 1, 6, 362 A.2d 545, 548 (1976). 
50. 71 N.J. 8, 11-12, 362 A.2d 549, 551 (1976). 
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21 (Supp. 1976). 
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-27 (Supp. 1976). 
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may dismiss further proceedings against the defendant.53 Subsection 
( c ), however, provides: 
[P]roceedings under this section shall not be available to any defen-
dant unless the court in its discretion concludes that: 
(1) The defendant's continued presence in the community, or 
in a civil treabnent center or program, will not pose a danger to the 
community; or 
( 2) That the terms and conditions of supervisory treabnent will 
be adequate to protect the public and will ben-fit the defendant 
by serving to correct any dependence on or use of controlled sub-
stances which he may manifest.54 
In Alston, a former police officer, found guilty of possession of heroin, 
was admitted to a section 27 program over the prosecutor's objection 
that Alston was ineligible because he was not found to be a drug user. 
The prosecutor also contended that Alston was a danger to the com-
munity and thus ineligible under subsection (c), because successful 
completion of a section 27 treatment program would permit him to 
resume his position as a police officer. 55 In Sayko, the defendant, who 
pleaded guilty to possession of L.S.D., amphetamines, and marijuana, 56 
was denied admission to a treatment program because he made no 
effort to interfere with the drug involvement of his younger, less edu-
cated sister, with whom he shared an apartment.57 
The court determined that admission into a drug treatment program 
was the proper disposition in both cases.58 Based upon statutory 
language which specifically included drug possession offenses,59 the court 
rejected arguments that treatment could only benefit drug users. The 
court found that, although the primary objective of the program is treat-
ment of users, "[p] rospective users, early stage users or experimenters" 
may also benefit from counseling and monitoring.6o In addition, the 
court noted that such defendants were "no less entitled" to the opportu-
nity to avoid the stigma of a criminal conviction than "acknowledged 
users." 61 
53. In the event of a guilty verdict, a judgment of conviction would not be en-
tered. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-27{b) (Supp. 1976). 
54. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-27{c) (Supp. 1976). 
55. 71 N.J. at 3-6, 362 A.2d at 545-48. Alston was acqUitted of possession of 
heroin with intent to distribute. Id. at 3, 362 A.2d at 545-6. 
56. Charges of possession with illtent to distribute were dismissed with the 
consent of the state. Id. at 10, 362 A.2d at 550. 
57. Transcript of sentence at 3-5, 10, 11, State v. Sayko, No. 711-JS-1972 (Law 
Div. Union County, Dec. 6, 1973). 
58. State v. Sayko, 71 N.J. at 7, 362 A.2d at 548; State v. Alston, 71 N.J. at 
13, 362 A.2d at 552. 
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-27{a) (Supp. 1976) lists offenses which deal with 
obtaining, possessing, and being under the influence of certain amounts of specifiC 
controlled dangerous substances. 
60. 71 N.J. at 5-6, 362 A.2d at 547. 
61. Id. at 6, 362 A.2d at 548. 
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The court provided guidance in the use of subsection (c) in two 
important respects. First, the court construed "a danger to the com-
munity" to refer only to the threat posed by the "defendant's conduct 
while a participant in the program." 62 Thus, the fact that Alston might 
have the opportunity to regain his position as a policeman after comple-
tion of the program was considered irrelevant to his admission to a 
section 27 program.63 Second, resolving a conflict in lower court de-
cisions,64 the court declared that the trial court had discretion to exclude 
defendants who satisfied the criteria set forth in subsection (c). 6Ii While 
courts are not confined by subsection (c), the court in Sayko determined 
that trial courts must use the "whole person concept" to determine 
whether a defendant should be admitted to a treatment program.66 
Noting that Sayko was a college graduate, had just secured full-time 
employment, was planning to get married, and was a first offender, 
the court, applying the "whole person concept," affirmed the appellate 
division's holding that the defendant's motion for admission to a section 
27 program should have been granted.67 The court found that, with 
regard to Sayko's conduct vis-a-vis his sister, the trial court improperly 
focused on the crime committed rather than on the general character 
of the defendant.6s In stressing the importance of adding personal 
factors to the evaluation, however, the court may have prevented trial 
courts from giving sufficient consideration to the seriousness of the crime 
the defendant committed. 
Alston and Sayko expand the scope of section 27 by removing ail 
doubt as to its applicability in cases which do not involve proven drug 
use. The court could have interpreted the word "supervisory treat-
ment" and the reference to correction of drug dependence in subsec-
62. rd. at 7, 362 A.2d at 548. 
63. The prosecution argued that a policeman with a background of posseSSion 
of heroin may be a danger to the community. rd. 
64. Compare State v. Bush, 134 N.J. Super. 346, 340 A.2d 697 (Law Div. 1975) 
(any defendant who comes within § 27 ( c) must be admitted), and State v. Sayko, 
No. A-1282-73 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (trial court criticized for not 
making any findings on the basis of § 27 (c) criteria) with State v. Johnson, 137 
N.J. Super. 27, 347 A.2d 543 (App. Div. 1975) (trial court's authority is not "cir-
cumscribed and defined solely" by § 27 ( c) ). 
65. 71 N.J. at 13, 545 A.2d at 552. 
66. rd. The whole person concept was described in State v. Green, 62 N.J. 
547, 566-67, 303 A.2d 312, 322-23 (1973) as a composite picture of the character 
of the defendant. 
67. 71 N.J. at 13, 362 A.2d at 552. 
68. The trial judge, however, had simply exercised his discretion in accordance 
with the standard proposed in State v. Johnson, 137 N.J. Super. 27, 31, 347 A.2d 543, 
545 (App. Div. 1975). There the appellate division determined that in sentenCing 
deciSions, the court should consider the further criminal implications of the defendant's 
conduct and the circumstances surrounding the criminal event. rd. 
The supreme court's emphasis on considering the offender as opposed to the offense 
is consistent with the policy established in PTI admissions decisions. See notes 1-48 
and accompanying text supra. 
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tion (c) to mean that treatment was available only to those who use 
drugs. By refusing to confine section 27 to drug users, the court re-
affirmed the state policy of more lenient treatment for minor first 
drug offenses. 611 
III. RESTITUTION AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION 
In State ex reZ. D. G. W.70 and State v. Harris,11 the court approved 
the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation for juvenile 
and adult offenders. In addition, the court established procedures 
necessary to afford due process in sentencing where restitution is 
imposed. 
D.C.W., a juvenile, pleaded guilty to charges of breaking and enter-
ing, theft, and destruction of property, along with three other youths. 
The juvenile and domestic relations court placed D.C.W. on proba-
tion for one year and required that he make restitution to a victim of 
the offense as a condition of his probation. The probation department, 
acting at the judge's order, determined that the youths had caused 
$626 worth of damage at one of the schools they had vandalized. 
D.C.W. was ordered by the probation department to pay one-fourth 
of that amount, $156.50.'2 The defendant contested the authority of 
the court to impose such a condition.73 
The supreme court held that the trial court possessed the authority 
to impose restitution under the statutes authOrizing reparation or resti-
tution as a condition of probation 74 and the statutes allowing proba-
tion for juveniles "upon such written conditions as the court deems 
will aid rehabilitation . . . ." 75 The court found that restitution was 
a rehabilitative measure and therefore was a valid disposition in ju-
venile matters. 76 
In finding the existence of statutory authOrity for the imposition of 
restitution, the court distinguished State v. Mulvaney 77 and State ex 
reZ. M.L.,7R in which the court had required statutory authorization 
independent of the general probation statute in order to validate the 
imposition of fines and costs as a condition of probation. In Mul-
69. See note 13 supra. 
70. 70 N.J. 488, 361 A.2d 513 (1976). 
71. 70 N.J. 586, 362 A.2d 32 (1976). 
72. 70 N.J. at 492, 361 A.2d at 515. 
73. Id. at 493, 361 A.2d at 515. 
74. Id. at 501, 361 A.2d at 520; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 168-1 (I971). 
75. N.]. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-61 (Supp. 1976); N.J. CT. R. 5:9-9. 
76. 70 N.J. at 500-01, 361 A.2d at 519-20. 
77. 61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972) (per curiam). 
78. 64 N.J. 438, 317 A.2d 65 (1974). See also People v. Crago, 24 Misc. 2d 739, 
740,204 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (Oneida County Ct. 1960); S. RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL 
COHRECTION 296 (ed. 1973) (restitution is not an authorized sentence unless made 
so by statute). 
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vaney, the court had determined that certain court-imposed costs 
were improper because contrary to specific provisions of the statute 
regulating award of court costs.79 The restitution imposed in D.C.W., 
however, did not conflict with any express statutory provision. In 
M.L., the court had found that the imposition of a fine on a juvenile 
was beyond its statutory authority.8o In D.C.W., the court distin-
guished M.L. by declaring that payment of a fine is punitive, whereas 
payment of restitution is rehabilitative.81 
In State v. Harris, the court upheld the use of restitution as a con-
dition of probation for adult offenders.82 Harris was convicted of 
fraudulently obtaining money from the Bergen County Welfare Board 
by concealing employment earnings. The trial judge imposed a sus-
pended sentence and three years of probation, with a condition of 
restitution of $1,0l2.83 The court determined that, since the goal of 
probation is rehabilitation, and the payment of restitution is rehabili-
tative, the general probation· statute authorized the imposition of 
restitution on an adult offender.84 
In D.C.W. and Harris, the defendants attacked the procedures 
used by the trial judge in fixing the amount and terms of restitution. 
In response, the court determined that due process is satisfied by 
providing a summary hearing. The court's findings need only be 
supported by some factual basis, not a preponderance of the evi-
dence.85 The supreme court then outlined the procedures to be 
followed in imposing restitution. First, the probation department 
must conduct an investigation into the extent of damages caused by 
the defendant and defendant's ability to pay. The department must 
then prepare a written report specifying the method used to deter-
mine the losses incurred. The report should be made available to 
the defendant prior to sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant may dispute the contents of the report and present evi-
dence in his own behalf. Except in extraordinary circumstances, the 
defendant need not be allowed to cross-examine the sources upon 
which the probation department relied. The judge should then deter-
mine the proper valuation method, the amount of damage for which 
79. 61 N.J. at 204-05, 293 A.2d at 669-70. 
80. 64 N.J. at 444, 317 A.2d at 68. 
81. See State ex rei. D.C.W., 70 N.J. at 495, 497-98, 362 A.2d at 516, 518. 
82. 70 N.J. at 591, 362 A.2d at 34. 
83. The jury finding of guilt was not determinative of the amount of money in-
volved. The amount of restitution was determined by the judge based on evidence 
presented at trial and information in the presentence report. See id. at 590-91, 362 
A.2d at 33-34. 
84. ld. at 592, 362 A.2d at 35. 
85. See State ex rel. D.C.W., 70 N.J. at 502-07, 361 A.2d at 521-23; State v. 
Harris, 70 N.J. at 594, 597-99, 362 A.2d at 36, 37-39. While a defendant may chal-
lenge the allocation of damages among multiple defendants, there is a presumption 
of proportionate liability against each defendant. 70 N.J. at 508, 361 A.2d at 524. 
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the defendant will be held responsible, how much the defendant is 
able to pay, and the terms of payment. The judge must also state 
the reasons for his decision to impose restitution. 
In D.C.W., the court remanded with directions to reestablish the 
amount of restitution because the probation department, not the trial 
court, had determined the terms of payment, and there had been no 
hearing as to the defendant's proportional liability or his ability to 
pay.S6 In Harris, noting that the trial court had not conducted the 
requisite investigation and had not sufficiently considered the ability 
of the defendant to pay, the court vacated the restitution condition as 
being excessiveY In view of the defendant's financial situation as a 
"welfare mother" struggling to support five children, the court found 
that restitution served no legitimate penal purpose.ss 
Harris may be read to prohibit imposition of restitution on defen-
dants who are welfare recipients.89 This might work to the disadvan-
tage of such defendants. Since some form of punishment will often 
be considered necessary if the offense and defendant's personal rec-
ord are less favorable than in Harris, imprisonment may be imposed 
on a welfare defendant whereas restitution would have been accept-
able for an economically independent defendant. It is unclear how 
trial judges will determine punishment in this situation.90 Perhaps 
judges will attempt to fashion more creative punishments, such as re-
quiring some type of community service, which may in fact have 
greater rehabilitative value.91 . 
While Harris may limit the application of restitution, both Harris 
and V.C.W. continue the supreme court's expansion of due process 
rights in sentencing.92 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
gone farther than the federal courts,93 it may not have gone far 
enough in establishing the procedure for deciding the quantum of 
restitution and the standard for determining the effect of the sentence 
on the defendant. 
86. ld. at 503-04, 507-09, 361 A.2d at 521-22, 523-24. 
8'7. 70 N.J. at 596-97, 362 A.2d at 37. For further discussion of Harris and 
review of allegedly excessive sentences, see generally 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 657 (1977). 
88. ld. at 596-97, 362 A.2d at 37. 
89. The application of Harris could be limited to situations where welfare recipients 
would have to make restitution to the same agency that must continue to provide the 
recipient a subsistence allowance. 
90. The trial court in Harris was obviously troubled by this dilemma. See Tran-
script of Sentence at 10-12, State v. Harris, No. S-295-73 (Law Div. Bergen County, 
July 26, 1973). 
91. See R. COLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 141 (1973). The court 
seems to favor such sentences. See State ex rel. D.C.W., 70 N.J. at 500 n.3, 361 A.2d 
at 519-20 n.3. 
92. See State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969). 
93. For example, no statement of reasons is required in federal courts follOWing 
sentencing. See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); United 
States v. Velazquez, 482 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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The court's newly adopted procedures closely parallel procedures 
required in parole and probation revocation hearings,94 which merely 
determine whether a violation of a previously established condition 
has occurred.95 In proceedings to establish restitution, however, a 
new liability is being determined. Since the defendant has been 
convicted in a proceeding in which he has had all of the procedural 
rights of a criminal trial, it might be thought that assessment of li-
ability should be relatively simple. There are, however, many com-
plex questions involved in that determination. For example, the ac-
tual amount of damages is not necessarily proven at trial. In Harris, 
the finding of guilt required no establishment of the amount illegally 
taken by the defendant; in fact, the records and testimony were con-
fused on that point.96 The amount of damage actually caused by 
any act is open to dispute.97 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether the New Jersey courts will be 
able to impose restitution for damages resulting from acts other than 
the precise ones of which the defendant was convicted.us If the courts 
94. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); State v. Johnson, 133 
N.J. Super. 457, 337 A.2d 387 (App. Div. 1975). 
95. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:167-9, -10, 2A:168-4 (1971); Lathrop v. 
Lathrop, 50 N.J. Super. 525, 534-35, 142 A.2d 920, 925 (App. Div. 1958). 
96. Brief for Defendant-Apfellant at 2-16, State v. Harris, No. A-99-73 (App. 
Div. Dec. 24, 1974). At tria the judge excluded as irrelevant evidence that the 
defendant was not receiving support payments. Brief at 22. Such evidence, however, 
would have been relevant to the issue of damages. 
97. For example, in People v. Miller, 256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20 
(1967), the defendant defrauded the victim of $821 by failing to do promised con-
struction work but was required to pay $8,600 as a condition of probation. The 
balance was the court's determination of the loss that resulted from the criminal act. 
98. Many states and the federal courts limit restitution payments to the crime for 
which the defendant was convicted. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183, 
187 (4th Cir. 1962); People v. Funk, 117 Misc. 778, 193 N .Y.S. 302 (Erie County 
Ct. 1921). Other states, however, permit payments to all parties aggrieved by a 
"course of criminal conduct." People v. Gallagher, 55 Mich. App. 613, 618, 223 
N.W.2d 92, 95 (1974). The New Jersey statute could lead to either result. It 
authorizes "restitution to the aggrieved parties for the damage or loss caused by his 
offense .... " N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:168-2 (1971). The proposed New Jersey 
Penal Code does not deviate significantly. It provides for "restitution of the fruits 
of his offense in an amount he can afford to pay, for the loss or damage caused 
thereby .... " I NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMISSION, THE NEW 
JERSEY PENAL CODE § 2C:45-1 (1971) (proposed). 
Dicta in both V.C.W. and Harris may also be read to support either construction 
of the New Jersey statute. For example, the court's repeated emphasis that sentences 
should be tailored to the offender and not the offense may imply that a proper resti-
tution order should include all ill-gotten gains or damage done by the defendant. 
See, e.g., State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. at 508, 361 A.2d at 524; State v. Harris, 70 
N.J. at 594, 362 A.2d at 36. Similarly, the limited standard of proof required and 
the court's willingness to allow restitution payments where the a'mount was not prop-
erly specified in the indictment indicate that the conviction does not limit the scope 
of the restitution payments ordered. State v. Harris, 70 N.J. at 597-98, 362 A.2d at 
37 -38. On the other hand, there is language to support the adoption of the federal 
approach. For example, "[tlhe restitution or reparation required may not go beyond 
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are not so confined, the sentencing judge will have to consider addi-
tional factual issues. The limited scope of the summary sentencing 
procedure may, however, expose the criminal defendant to what is 
essentially a civil liability with less procedural protection than he 
would have in a civil triaP9 The defendant has limited ability to 
contest the probation department's determination of valuation. Such 
civil defenses as proximate cause and comparative or contributory 
negligence are unavailable to the defendant. Finally, the judge's 
findings may be supported by less than a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Although conditions of probation cannot be imposed without 
the consent of the defendant,lOO that consent is given under threat of 
a prison sentence. Consequently, it is no substitute for adequate 
procedural safeguards. 
The due process requirements adopted by the court are also inade-
quate for determining whether restitution will in fact serve a rehabili-
tative purpose. While many experts agree that restitution will often 
be beneficial to the defendant, they do not necessarily agree that resti-
tution is a desirable disposition for all defendants.lol Therefore, the 
the actual loss or damage as established in the prosecution and must be directly 
related to the crime." State ex rei. D.C.W., 70 N.J. at 500 n.3, 361 A.2d at 519 n.3, 
quoting S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION, 200-01 (ed. 1963). More-
over, in D.C.W. the court indicated that as part of the required procedure prior to 
sentencing, the probation department should "conduct an investigation of the incident[s] 
contained in the complaint .... " 70 N.J. at 503, 361 A.2d at 521. This seems 
to limit the scope of restitution. 
99. The New Jersey stahlte authorizes both restihItion and reparation. N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A: 168-2 (1971). "Restitution normally consists of reimbursement of that 
sum of money which the defendant appropriated in the commission of his criminal 
act . . .. Reparation is generally considered to be synonymous with tort dam-
ages .... " Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 CEO. L.J. 809, 826 
(1963). 
100. N.J. CT. H. 3:21-7 requires the defendant to sign a receipt upon receiving 
a copy of the conditions of probation. If he refuses to sign, he is resentenced. 
101. The issue of whether restitution in general and in these cases in particular is 
rehabilitative was not litigated in either case. Hence, the court's conclusions were 
based on its own independent investigation. The court's conclusion that restitution is 
rehabilitative was based on dicta from cases in other jurisdictions and quotations from 
several books on penology. But the court's own authorities do not necessarily support 
the view that restitution is always rehabilitative. For example, one of the quoted 
authorities cited in both D.C.W. and Harris in support of restitution as a rehabilitative 
tool has also stated: "To be sure, treatment considerations may indicate that restihI-
tion should not be ordered. It is no magic formula. The backgrounds and needs of 
the individual case should determine whether or not the stipulation is to be laid 
down." D. DRESSLER, PnACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 241 (2d ed. 
1969). Another commentator has reported: "A probation and parole agent in the 
Wisconsin State Department of Public Welfare stated that he thought restitution 
orders frequently interfered with the rehabilitation of probationers. He said that 
probation was in danger of becoming a form of collection for victims rather than a 
period of rehabilitation for probationers." R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION 
AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCING 105 n.15 (1969). See also 
RUBIN, supra note 78, at 231-32 & n.130. It appears that in order for restitution to 
have the desired effect, it must be considered as part of a total treatment program 
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court should have included a requirement that the presentence report 
attempt to evaluate the psychological impact of the sentence upon the 
defendant.lo2 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In considering the disposition of criminal defendants, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has given priority to the goal of rehabilitation. 
The court has sought to establish procedures which would insure that 
each defendant receives treatment tailored to his individual needs. 
The desire for the criminal justice system to have a positive impact 
on those with whom it deals has a long history in this country. loa Dis-
illusionment wi,th the ability of prisons to achieve significant rehabilita-
tive results has been growing, however.lo4 It remains to be seen whether 
the use of alternative dispositions which the New Jersey Supreme 
Court appears to be encouraging will be able to achieve the results 
it was once sincerely believed that prisons could achieve. It may be 
that the court will continue to find rehabilitation an elusive goal. Fur-
thermore, the standards the court has used in discussing rehabilitation 
may prejudice other objectives, su?h as equal treatment of offenders 
and minimization of administrative arbitrariness. For example, de-
and' imposed only where it will serve the psychological needs of the particular defen-
dant. Courts have long recognized that "[t]here can be no real reformation of a 
wrongdoer, unless there is at least a willingness on his part to right the wrong 
committed." People v. Lippner, 219 Cal. 395, 399, 26 P.2d 457, 458 (1933). 
It is doubtful whether court-imposed restitution can be conducted in the voluntary 
atmosphere necessary for rehabilitation. The initial decision to accept probation and 
its concomitant conditions is made with a prison sentence as the alternative. More-
over, the coercive nature of probation increases after the terms have been established. 
A defendant who feels that the making of restitution payments is wrong must consider 
the fact that, by refUSing to continue making such payments, he will subject himself 
not only to the sentence he originally escaped but also to treatment as if he had 
committed an additional crime, to wit, probation violation. The defendant knows 
that although probation violation is not really a crime, it is treated as such by the 
courts. A court is likely to impose a higher sentence when probation is violated 
than it would have imposed before the impOSition of probation. See, e.g., Remer v. 
Ragan, 104 F.2d 704 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 (1939); In re White, 18 
N.J. 449, 114 A.2d 261 (1955); State v. Driesse, 95 N.J. Super. 491, 494, 231 A.2d 
835, 836 (App. Div. 1967). Furthermore, probation violation is part of a person's 
record which is considered in sentencing for subsequent crimes. See DAWSON, supra, 
at 82. 
102. As indicated in note 23 supra and accompanying text, the courts may not be 
able to make such a determination. This calls into question the legitimacy of impos-
ing restitution if the court feels that it can only be justified as a rehabilitative tool. 
103. See D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 79-108 (1971). The sys-
tem of indeterminate sentencing used throughout the country is an outgrowth of the 
"rehabilitative ideal." See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCUON 53-58 
(1968); Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. 
L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 226, 226-27 (1959). 
104. See, e.g., O'Leary, Gottfredson, & Gelman, Contemporary Sentencing Proposals, 
2 CRIM. L. BULL. 555 (1975); State Correction Chief Asks End To Indeterminate 
Tel"q18 in Prison, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1976, at 40, col. 1. See also note 13 supra. 
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fendants accused of committing the same crime are to be treated 
differently based on factors unrelated to their offense. lOO The vagtle-
ness of such criteria and the fact that even professionals would differ 
on particular judgments will make statewide uniformity and predict-
ability in applying the court's standards difficult to achieve.loo 
Charles Shafer 
105. The New Jersey Supreme Court has implicitly approved criteria based on 
whether the defendant belongs to a class of people likely to commit crimes. In 
Leonardis, for instance, the court cited defendant Leonardis' employment and unblem-
ished record and defendant Rose's full-time student status as "pertinent factors" relat-
ing to their "rehabilitative potential." 71 N.J. at 111-12, 363 A.2d at 335. The 
same kinds of factors led tIte court in Sayko to conclude tItat the defendant should 
have been admitted to a section 27 program. See text accompanying note 67 supra. 
Use of these criteria is acknowledged I1S a "creaming" process in New Jersey PTI 
programs. Zaloom, supra note 5, at 191. "This leads to a situation where persons 
are punished for what it is believed tItey wiU do, ratIter tItan for what tItey have 
done." O'Leary, Gottfredson, & Gelman, supra note 104, at 565 (1975). Judge 
Frankel recognized the middle-class bias of "individualized justice" as being at war 
with the concept of equal treatment before tIte law. M. FRANKEL, CmMINAL SEN-
TENCES 10-11 (1972). 
106. See Coffee, supra note 23, at 1373. This is tIte same danger presented by the 
application of tIte rehabilitative ideal to other lhases of tIte criminal justice system: 
"At every level-from prosecutor to parole-boar members--tIte concept of individuali-
zation has been used to justify secret procedures, unreviewable decision making, and 
an unwillingness to formulate anything otIter tItan the most general rules or policy." 
AMERICAN FRlENDS SERVlCE CoMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 40 (1971). 
